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Abstract: The article treats the problem of different understandings of inte-
gral Yugoslavism by various political groups and representatives of national
elites which have joined into Yugoslavia in December of 1918 The author
made an attempt to specify possible causes of susbequent Yugoslav national
misunderstandings which ended in bloodshed and catastrophy of 1941.
The idea of a Southern Slavic unification dates back to the early
I qth century. However, its meaning changed throughout the previous
century to denote various notions, blurring the perception as a clear
concept of a unified state.
The Yugoslav concept was widespread particularly among
Southern Slavs in the Habsburg Monarchy. The trialistic solution of
the state organization within an aged empire implied the creation of a
Yugoslav unit within Austria Free-thinking intellectuals from Croatia
were especially zealous about the idea. The Illyrian movement,
launched in the mid-19th century, was gradually transformed into a
movement for the attainment of this political objective.
At the time when national movements were rising throughout
Europe, Croats attempted to tread that path. Numerically, politically and
economically weak, they were unable to achieve the national ideal of a
sovereign state. Instead, they sought a milder variation. On the one hand,
they became reconciled with the status of an autonomous unit, accepting
the Danube Monarchy as an actual political framework. On the other,
they strengthened their national position, linking it with other Southern
Slavs and Slavic peoples in the Empire. Certain champions of reform
in Austria favored such a settlement. It provided a good way to pre-
serve the Habsburg empire as an integral multi-national state.
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The Serbs from Austria had a somewhat different aim. Along
with the rise of the state of Serbia in the previous century, Serbs from
Austria looked more often toward national unification with Serbia, put-
ting the idea of a Serbian state at the top of their nationalist aspirations
Hindered in their primary goal, Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia-Herze-
govina made agreements with other Southern Slavs within the Empire
in quest of a secondary road for national organization. The Serbo-Croat
Coalition arose from these incentives in 1905. 1
Then Serbia, as an autonomous state factor, persistently set the
liberation and unification of all Serbs at the top of her national aspira-
tions Even when plans for a Balkan, and subsequently, Yugoslav com-
munity emerged on the political scene, they were viewed only as a
far-reaching possibility. For Serbia, Yugoslav unification could be at-
tained only as an extension of the Serbian national idea, not as a substi-
tute for it
*
* *
Yugoslav unification was first established as the primary and
highest ideal of Serbian state politics in 1914. Commencement of a
world war and the bloody fighting waged by the Serbian army in the
late summer and fall of the same year drastically changed the views of
the Serbian government
A manifesto to the Serbian people, issued by Regent Alexander
on July 29th, 1914, contained an indication of the new policy, men-
tionmg the evil-doings of the Austrian authorities against Serbs, and
Croatians as well.
The Regent was more explicit in a proclamation from Kragujevac
several days later:
"...the howls of our brothers that have reached us from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Banat, Backa, from Croatia, Slavonia, Srem and from
our seaside, the jagged Dalmatia.. "2
Prvislav Grisogono wrote about this in I<)3~: "There was neither in the program.
nor in the intentions of the orcanization (Serbo-Croatian Coalition, author' s
remark) the liberation and uniJication of all Yugoslavs around Belgrade"
Ujcdinicna Jugoslavija. LJubljana 1938. ')6 And agam: "The Battle of Kumanovo
is in that sense a real date as it definitivelx settled the differences over whom and
around what centrum would unificatiori and liberation be carried out to the
advantage of the Karadjordjevic dynasty in Belgrade," Grisogono, 59.
.2 Grisogono, 71.
At roughly the same time, Pasic himself came out for the
boundaries of the new state somewhere along the line "Klagenfurt-
Marburg-Szeged" ,
In late August I C) 14, the government of the Kingdom of Serbia
formed a committee from its best scholars commissioning it to make
out a program for Yugoslav unification. The committee included Ljuba
Jovanovic, Aleksandar Belie, Jovan Cvijic, Nikola Stojanovic, Slobo-
dan Jovanovic and some other eminent professors. After a few days.
on September 4. a ministerial council set out the basic course of the
program: I) a strong centralized state necessary to preserve peace in
the Balkans and Europe in the future; 2) the state should constitute Ser-
bia with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Vojvodina, Dalmatia, Croatia, Istria and
Slovenia: 3) the state would preserve the balance on the Adriatic and
Mediterranean: 4) Bulgaria may Join the state on a federal or similar
basis."
Instructions given by Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic on the
same day were quite specific:
u .. the ultimate concessions beyond which Serbia must not and
cannot go are lands east of the Bregalnica to the confluence of the Lak-
ovi ca River, from there southward by the watershed between the east-
ern side of the Vardar River and waters flowing into the Strumica to
the Serbo-Bulgarian border on Mount Belasica - and this on the condi-
tion that the Tripartite Agreement wins and that Serbia gains all Serbo-
Croatian lands in Austria-Hungary."
Once again, Pasic addressed the allied forces on November 5 in a
bid to explain Serbia's war objectives
"Serbia is struggling not only for herself, but for the other Balkan
nations as well... Serbia is fighting for the independence of all Balkan
nations. 116
The Yugoslav unification program was finally framed in a Ser-
bian government Declaration m Nis, III early December, 1914. Among
other things, the proclamation read:
"Convinced in the confidence of the National Assembly as long
as it puts its forces to serve the great cause of the Serbian state and the
3 M I.kmccic Ratni ciljevi Srbi]« N 1-/. 5!.odillc. Belgrade ! lr7~. Xcl
cl Fkmccic. Ratni Cl11C\'i. X7 Ljubinka Trgovcevic, Srpski naucnici i jugoslovensko
ujedinjenje, Belgrade ]9SX. 3(1-32
< Diplomaiski arhi-, SFRJ, political department. "Pasic 1(1 SpalaJkmic·'. highl ,
classified No cl600 folder XXII, code number RO
6 Dragoslav Jank:o\ic.\'i.~kadeklaracija Isroriia XX vcka. X. 1%l). 25-26.
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Serbo-Croatian and Siovenian tribes.. the royal government maintains
as its chief duty in these crucial moments to secure a happy end to this
huge struggle which, since it has been launched, has become a struggle
for liberation and unification of all our unl iberatecl brothers - Serbs.
Croats and Slovenes. "7
There is no question, Serbia's official policy changed. Instead of
seeking Serbian national unification, it set out the creation of a com-
mon state of Southern Slavs as a primary aspiration.
The question, however, is - what made Serbia take that step It
appears at first glance that the Nis Declaration extinguished the Ser-
bian national program. s Why')
In 1914, the Kingdom of Serbia was in a very unfavorable posi-
tion, in a state of war against the great and strong Dual Monarchy The
Yugoslav idea was meant to serve as an internal weapon to debilitate
Austria-Hungary and blunt her military power." In the first year of the
war, 20-25% were Serbs and over 50% were Croats on the Austrian
side. 10 The program of Southern Slavic unification might have helped
internationalize the Serbian question in the national sense and state-
wise, especially before the western allies. The creation of a big state in
the Balkans would provide a balance on the Peninsula It would pre-
vent Italy's penetration toward the eastern coast of the Adriatic and
curb her influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, Austria-Hun-
gary would be distanced from the Balkans, delivering thus a serious
blow to her survival as a mid-European state.
Therefore, the Nis Declaration, the commencing document of
Southern Slavic unification, was much more the result of concrete po-
litical and military circumstances surrounding Serbia than an expres-
sion of centuries-long aspirations of Southern Slavs to a single state
7 Gnsogono. c;:I
8 There are other opmions. Ante Smith Pavelic maintained that the Declaration of
Nis in fact advocated the Idea of Serbian unification under the veil of the
unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Ill' also believed that this program
meant the inclusion of Croats and Slovenes into a Greater Serbia should
circumstances permit after the war According to this author, Pasic feared mostlv
a decision by the allies supporting the creation of an independent Croatia that
would encompass all or most of the Habsburg Southern Slavic territories See
Ante Smith Pavclic. Dr "Inte' Trial/hie:': problemi hrvatsko-srpskih odnosa. Munich
J959. H-35.
9 Istorija srpskog naroda T7-2.68-70
10 Dragoslav Jankovic, 0 uticaju prvog svetskog rata na resavanje jugoslovenskog
pitanja, in Stvaranje jugoslovenske drzave 1918. godine, Belgrade 1989, 145.
Milorad Ekmecic, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918. Belgrade 1989,696
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Within a complex international situation, confronted with a formidable
enemy, Serbia sought deliverance, and a way out. All efforts launched
by the Serbian govemment were aimed toward that objective. The Yu-
goslav idea was accepted out of need, not conviction. Few notable
scholars and intellectuals developed the concept of Southem Slav
unity, with common national and state interests, and believed in it sin-
cerely. Politics is a practical activity and deals with momentary or
short-term solutions. It was thus with the Declaration of December 7,
1914. Clothed in fine garments of Serb, Croatian and Slovenian na-
tional unity, it was motivated by the actual needs of Serbia, threatened
by the horrors of war.
*
* *
There was much talk, there is still today, of plans for the creation
of a large Serbian state at the end of World War I. Its champions usu-
ally maintain that Serbia had a free choice between the expansion of
Serbia through unIiberated regions and Southern Slavic unity. Follow-
ing from this is that the Serbian govemment and Regent Alexander
chose freely a single state of Southern Slavs. Frequently mentioned are
offers from the allies during the war suggesting the forming of a
Greater Serbia in the Balkans.
This complex question calls for a more detailed examination
from the angle of foreign policy conducted by the powers of the En-
tente.
Great Britain in particular was opposed to the creation of a big
Slavic state in the Balkans. In 1878, Lord Salisbury stressed that the
unification of Serbia and Montenegro would lead to a Slavic confed-
eration and ultimately to a big Slavic state stretching from Pirot to the
Adriatic. I I That is why the Nis Declaration was received with reserva-
tions in London. 12 In late December, 1914, Britain first proposed terri-
torial concessions to Serbia. Serbia was to obtain Bosnia-Herzegovina,
access to the sea and part of Albania on the condition of ceding a large
part of Macedonia to Bulgaria. 13 Similar plans were proposed again in
the Foreign Office in the first halfof 1915.
11 Public Record Office (Arhiv Srbije), "Salisbury to Cross", Berlin, 19.06.187R, FO
78, vo12899. .
12 See: Dragoljub R Zivojinovic. Velika Srbija iii -JURoslavila? Velika Britanija i
jugoslovensko ujedinjcnje 1914- 1918. Arhiv 7<1 istonju zdravstvene kulturc Srbije.
18. 1989. 95.
13 Zivojinovic.98-99
\(,2
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The concessions were conditioned by Britain's policy toward It-
aly and her terntorial ambitions in the Adriatic and Dalmatia.
In August that same year, the British foreign secretary proposed
that the following regions be gIven to Serbia in the event of allied vic-
torv Bosma-Herzegovina. Slavonia Srern, Gatka, Adriatic coast up to
10 km south of Cavtat, the islands Veliki and Mali Zirone, BUJe. Solta,
Brae, Jakljan and the Peljesac peninsula. The plan envisaged the set-
tling of the question of Banat through a peace accord unless Romania
joined the Entente. The demand that Serbia cede to Buglaria part of
Macedonia was repeated on the basis of item two of a 1912 secret
agreement which prevented a common border between Serbia and
Greece. 14
In April, 1915, Italy joined the allies, demanding and winning
specific territorial concessions for its participation m the war opera-
tions I:' The London accord, a secret agreement between England.
France, Russia and Italy, was SIgned on April 26, 1915. I (, Italy actually
declared war on Austria on May 23, 191 S. Before engaging in war
against Germany, Italy waited for fifteen months, until August, 1916.
Even Croatian historians admit that the London accord so intimidated
Croatian politicians for leaving to the Italians hundreds of thousands of
Croats and Slovenes. that they approached the Serbian government for
chiefly this reason. It became clear that Croatian and Slovene unifica-
tion depended on Serbia's success. 17
14 Public Record Office. "Grev to Buchanon". !(1()8I l) j:' . FO ~7L \01 22():=; The
demand of the [~ntente was' sent to Serbia first on August ~(). Il) 14. and ag,a1l1 in
notes dating from Mm 25. I';J I:=; ami August ~ the S,1111l' Year Sec: lstorija
srpskog naroda VI-2. 4)-84
1:' Italy was promised territories ltalia lrredenta (Trcntino, southern Tirol, Istria.
Gorica. Trieste, a large part of the Dalmatian coast from Lisarnica and Trbanj to
the headland or PIanka with Zadar except the island of Brae. the K varner islands).
part of Albania around Valona. sovercigntv on the Dodekancsc Islands. the
Turkish province of Adolia I1l ASia Minor. colonia] expansion in Africa and a
share in the reparations See AlP. Tavlor. The First World II ill', Penguin Hooks.
I%~, 89-90 Charles and Barbara Jclavich. the Establishment ofBalkan Nationa!
,')'tatcs 180-1-1920. Washington Universitv Press. 1977,288
I() The real conditions of the London agreement were disclosed by the Bolsheviks in
] 918 after the Soviet revolution when they refused to accept the obligations
undertaken bv imperial Russia. \ IS President Wocdraw Wilson opposed this
accord mostlv because of Its open VIOlation of national principle That IS whv the
United States refused to accept the provisions of this pact as binding /\t the Pans
Peace Conference 111 1919. both (Treat Bnuun and France turned against Italv
Sec AJ.P.TavloL l) I.
17 Ivo Banac, The Yationa[ (jllestioll ill Yugoslavia. Cornell \ Inivcrsitx Press. 1984,
119
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Regardless of whether the Serbian government chose to create a
Greater Serbia or strove toward Yugoslav unification.!" Italy's de-
mands were contrary to Serbia's national interest. Italy's breakthrough
to the Adriatic coast posed a grave threat and unsurmountable obstacle
to the war aims of the Kingdom of Serbia.
In 1916, Britain maintained that Serbia should be allowed to ex-
pand in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slavonia, but always on the condition
of ceding Macedonia to Bulgaria. III A cabinet reshuffle in Great Brit-
ain, when David Lloyd George became prime minister, brought only a
minimal alteration in Britain's policy in view of the Serbian question.
The first memorandum, issued after the new cabinet was set up, pro-
posed the idea of separate peace with Austria-Hungary. At the same
time, the Yugoslav kingdom was conceived as a federal unit in a re-ar-
ranged Habsburg Monarchy Bosnia-Herzegovina was ceded to Serbia
and the latter was allowed to unify with Montenegro.i''
At the close of 1917, Britain's policy regarding Serbia and the
federal arrangement of the Habsburg Monarchy acquired a more defi-
nite outline. There were two different concepts of settling the Balkan
problem Some politicians proposed that Serbia become part of the
Danube monarchy Others adhered to the plans of 1915 and 19162 1
During negotiations for a separate peace with Austria-Hungary be-
tween English General Smats and Mansdorf, Great Britain reiterated
that it did not want the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy.F
Finally, in the summer of 1918, the British government declared
Itself in favor of Yugoslav unification within a single and independent
state. 23
Adhering to its old course in preserving balance in the Balkans,
Britain was far from enthusiastic over the creation of a Greater Serbia
Such a state would disturb the overall balance of forces in southeastern
Europe. Thus Britain was obstinately insistent that both empires,
18 Croatian historians agree that for Serbia, the unification of the Southern Slavs was
in fact equal to Serbian unification. See: Ante Smith Pavelic, 34-35.
19 See: K. J Calder. Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914-1918,
Cambridge I97Cl. \)3-<)7 V II Rothwell. British TVar Aims and Peace Diplomacy
191-1-1918. Oxford Iq71.~1-~3
20 Public Record C)ffice. "The Drummond Memorandum". Februarx 12. 1917. FC)
gOO. vol 20 Cited m: l,ivojinovi6. In7-108 .
21 l.ibrarv of the I-louse 01' Lords. David Llovd George Papers. 1'/45/9110. The
(Tener;t1 Smats Memorandum. Mardi 14. It) IX. See Zivoil11ovi6. lOS.
')"") Dragoslav Janko. ic i.nd Mirko lvlirkovic. Drzavnopravna istorija Jugoslavije,
Bel~!Tade )l)89. 349
23 /,iyZ1Jinoyie J(l~
Habsburg and Ottoman, must survive the war whatever the cost In that
View, nothing had changed in Britain's policy since the early 19th cen-
tury. The belated acceptance of the Yugoslav idea only appears to be a
renunciation of this political course In fact Britain realized that a fu-
ture unified Yugoslavia would be a smaller Austria-Hungary - a multi-
national state with similar internal problems as were troubling the
Habsburg Monarchy. If It was no longer possible to preserve Austria-
Hungary, then it was necessary to create a state similar to it That was
Yugoslavia. Large enough to maintain stability in the Balkans, but too
weak inside to develop into a regional force. The principle that applied
to Vienna was passed over to Belgrade~--l
Offers bv Great Britain for the creation of a Greater Serbia were
mentioned only while the war was in duration, until its final outcome
became definite. The role of the Serbian army in crushing the resis-
tance of the central forces was the chief reason why Bntam had made
the offers, to convince the Serbs In their good mtentions. But even
then, any thought of Serbian expansion westward and northward meant
giving up territories in the south. Thus British plans for a Greater Ser-
bia looked more like moving Serbia north-westward than truly unify-
ing all Serbian lands
It was naive to expect that the big powers, particularly Great
Britain, would wholeheartedly stand on the Serbian side and allow Ser-
bian national unification. The end of the war brought noticeable
changes in boundaries, but the balance of forces and world policy in
regard to the Serbian question did not alter. Quite the contrary.
*
* *
The decisive step in the creation of the single state of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes was made in the summer of 1917 in Corfu. The
Corfu conference, comprising on one side members of the Yugoslav
Committee and on the other the Serbian royal government, issued a
24 "From the side of the Yuaoslux committee It has alrcadx been set out that the
committee represents eight million. and the Serbian 'fW\emment only four
million. We in Belgrade are gaining the impression that certain Croatian circles
have a plan to separate Serbia and Montenegro from the rest of our regions, and
instead of a simple state wherein they fear lest Serbs should be the onlx
spokesmen. they create a purclv Austrian combination Without am originalitv,
too. merelv cop\lng the relationship between Austria and l-Iungarv." Arhiv
Juaoslavije, "Nincic to Pribicevic" on November 28, 191X, folder XIL doc I.
Se~. Ekniecic, Stvaranje Jugoslavije, 811-812
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declaration on the future arrangement of the state. The accord is often
assumed to be the basis of Yugoslav unification, although its character
is still debatable. From the standpoint of law and politics
The conference was held from June IS to July 20, 1917. After a
lengthy and trying discussion, an act was framed, defining the bases
for future unification. Its premise was the national unity of Southern
Slavs, underlining the right to national self-determination. Naturally,
the Croatians were interested the most in the latter principle The
agreement envisaged that the state be named the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, led by the royal family Karadjordjevic. The fu-
ture community was to be a constitutional, parliamentary and demo-
crane monarchy. Suffrage was universal and civil and political
freedom guaranteed. It was agreed finally that a freely elected Con-
stituent Assembly would frame decision on the constitutional arrange-
ment and that the constitution would be adopted by a "numerically
qualified majority" 2'\
The Corfu Declaration indeed became the foundation of Yugo-
slav unification. The basic principles set out in Corfu were included in
the 1921 Constitution of St. Vitus' Day. Yet, however paradoxical this
may sound, the motives of both sides were temporary, and different at
the core. Each side saw in the accord its own needs and advantages at
that particular time.
Pasic persistently avoided a written accord with the Yugoslav
Committee as long as imperial Russia existed Only Russia was dis-
posed to see an Orthodox Serbia 111 the Balkans rather than a mixed
Catholic and Orthodox cornmumty. After the fall of the Russian em-
pire in February. 1917, Pasic signed the declaration, mostly to show
his western allies that the survival of Austria-Hungary was impossible.
But Pasic himself did not want to go beyond the declaration. His con-
vinction was firm in annexing regions 111 Austria-Hungarv to the King-
dom of Serbia It was a matter of new tactics in regard to altered
international circurnstances.:" Besides this, he was pressured by the
opposition of independents who pushed for integral Yugoslavism.
Teamed with the Yugoslav Committee, they could jeopardize the supe-
riority of the radicals at the head of Serbia. The radical majority in the
Serbian parliament was stronger by only a few seats. Pasic feared the
2:' Fordo Sisic, / iokumenti 0 postanku Kraljevine Srba. Hrvata i Slovenaca
19J.1-/9/9. /,(jgrch Ino, en .
26 Slobodan .IlWaI10\ie, /z istorije i kniizevnosti I, Belgrade 1991, 17)
1(,(, rvlilan Sl. !'rotie
Serbian opposition and the Southern Slavs from Austria-Hunuarv
might reach agreement without the radicals, even turn against them So
he agreed to the declaration.
The Serbian government rej ected a proposal by the Yugoslav
Committee to hold a national congress, comprising Serbian National
Assembly deputies, members of the Yugoslav and Montenegrin com-
mittees for national 1I1l1fi cati OIL represenran yes of the Serbian arrnv
and other Southern Slavic organizations, chaired by Regent Aleksan-
darn Pasic was on no condition prepared to recognize the Yugoslav
Committee, not even if the Committee undertook the obligation to pur-
sue the politics of the Serbian govemment.r'' This clearly shows that
Pasi c considered the Corfu Declaration for the future. At that time, all
authorirv had to remain 111 the competence of the Serbian government.
On the occasion of the founding of the Yugoslav Committee IJ1
1915, its chairman, Dr. Ante Trumbic. defined the general course of
politics in the future
"Our organization has to work in accord with Serbia, of course,
but not in her name and only privately without (111)' external labels
Subsequently, when events take place and the liquidation of Austria-
Hungary matures, our organization will be formally set up as a com-
mittee of Southern Slavic lands subject to Austria-Hungary and as such
would stand before the European public with the task of working on
liberating all our lands as a whole, regardless of the destinv of Serbia
and Montenegro "=')
Croats, on the other hand. believed that given the overall circum-
stances, their interest lay in coming closer to Serbia. They, too, sought
a way to raise their question before the world. To them, the Corfu Dec-
laration was one of a number of possi bile ways to carry out thei I' inten-
non Only two weeks before the Corfu Conference opened, on May 30,
the Yugoslav Club in the Viennese parliament adopted another decla-
ration, the so-called "May Declaration" which said:
"On the basis of national principles and Croatian state law, they
demand the unification of all lands in the monarchy inhabited by Slo-
venes, Croats and Serbs into a single autonomous state body, free from
27 Sec: Nikola Stojanovic, Pred stvaranjem Jugoslavije . "Nova Lvropa". Januarv
1927.
2R Slobodan Jovanovic. l'a.~ic'· i Jugoslovenski odbor. in Iz istorijc i kniizcvnosti I,
Ikl&!.radc 19lJI. !lJX-202
29 Ante SI1111h Pawlie, 3'"
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alien rule and based on democracy, under the scepter of the Habsburg-
Lorraine dynasty. 11\1)
A meeting of Croatian politicans held in Zagreb in August 1917
accepted the Corfu Declaration, though with reservations, hut clearlv
set out the need to preserve Croatian statehood in the new state3 1
Thus the Corfu Declaration appeared to be a firm basis for Yugo-
slav unification and proof of agreement on the arrangement of the sin-
gle state community. However, all the different interests and perceptions
of unification remained beneath the formal agreement.
The path toward Yugoslav unification appeared more like a senes
of compromises between Serbian and Croatian national isms than the
creation of a common national ideology. TIle true nature of the Serbo-
Croat relations was best revealed at the Geneva Conference held in
early November, 1918. Now when western allies had fully accepted
the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy, the political repre-
sentatives of the Kingdom of Serbia (Nikola Pasic), members of the
Yugoslav Committee (Dr. Ante Trumbic) and the National Council
(Dr. Anton Korosec) met again.V
In those intemational circumstances, England and France favored
a Yugoslav state to an expanded Serbia and a fortified Italy with a
dominant position on the Adriatic Sea, therefore in the Mediterra-
nean-':'
Of all the accords leading to the fraternization of the Southern
Slavs, the Geneva Declaration triggered most of the protests and
caused much hesitation. Although generalized in character, the docu-
ment established two basic principles. The principle of the national
uruty of Yugoslavs, that is, their willingness to join the state commu-
nity, and the factual existence of three Southern Slavic states (Serbia,
Montenegro and the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). The Geneva
Declaration confirmed the Corfu accord whereby the final state ar-
rangement was to he settled Jl1 a Constituent Assembly. What made the
accord disputable is an interim solution until the Assembly was con-
.i0 Sisic. l)4
31 Ferdo Culinovic . .Ittgoslavija izmedju dva rata I. 7agreb 196 J. 4.2-4)
j2 The Serbian parharncntarv delegation comprised Vojislav Marinkovic. Milorad
I )rasko\ic and Marko l~itb)vJC On behalf or the Yugoslav committee taking part
in the conference \\ere Dr. U ustav Grcgorm. Dusan Vasilj evic. Dr. Nikola
Stoianovic and Jovan Banianin The National Council from Zagreb was
represented by Dr. Delko Cingrija and OrGregor Zcrja\ Culinovic. 80.
33 Culinovic. 79.
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vened. During that period, the declaration envisaged the existance of
two states (Serbia and the State of SCS) which voluntarily join the
community as equal members. Montenegro was left to decide herself
on joining the new state. The Geneva Dec! aration concl uded that the
Serbian government and National Council "were conducting their af-
fairs each in their own internal and territorial fields of activitv in a
regular manner"3--1 An interim government of twleve members was to
deal only with qucsnons of general interest foreign affairs, army. navy
and setting up a Constituent Assembly. Each of the parties gained the
right to each appoint six representatives to a joint ministry For the be-
ginning, six ministers, three from each side .. were appointed. The Ser-
bian ministers took oath to the Serbian King.. and the others to the
National Counci I in Zagreb
The Geneva document established a dualistic solution to the
Southern SlaVIC unification and indirectly prognosticated a federal ar-
rangement of the future state. A decree whereby the interim govern-
ment was obliged to act "in connection with the national governments"
of the member states, introduced an element of confederal ism 111 the
mutual relations of the two equal state subjects."
The spirit of the Geneval Declaration was doubtless taken from
the Austro-Hungarian deal of 1867. Under the influence of Croatian
demands. but also integral Yugoslavism at all costs of the Serbian op-
position.I" Pasic was forced to Yield and sign the Geneva accord
France played a special role 1Il this among the international factors.:"
Very indisposed to what had been agreed to at the Geneva Lake,
Regent Alexander and members of the Serbian ministeral council re-
jected the Geneva deal. The prime minister's envoy, Stojan Protic, was
irreconcilable in this point:
34 Slobodan Jovanovic. l'olitickc i prav/ll.' mspravc 2. Belgrade lLJ32. 2lJ)
3:; Culinovic. RO-~n
3() In a telegram sent from Pans to Salonika on October 1LJ. 191 R. Pasic complained
to the r~egent and Stojan Protic that the Serbian opposition was assisting the
Yugosluv Committee in Its stTllgp.lc agamst the Scrllim1 p.o\emmenl Svelo/aJ
Pribiccvic. / uktatura kralja .lIcksandra. Belgrade llJ52. 38-3LJ
37 ln earlv November. I918.. French President Raymond Poincare called Serbian
CnVOy'111 Paris Milenko Vesnic and advised him to reach accord WIth the
Yugoslav representatives from Austria-Hungarv as early as possible, warning of
Italv s major action to neutralize the Yugoslav thesis on unification Explaining
hIS signature. Pasic on November 1() sent a telegram to the Regent and Stojan
Prouc reaffirrninu the efforts of the French President for an accord as soon as
possible. Scc Pril,lcevlc. 41-42
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"Yugoslav politicians have been liberated thanks to the Serbs and
allies, yet spiritually they are still in bondage. They are in Austria-
Hungarys ideology. "38
And again:
"The intention of Yugoslav politicians is to separate Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srern, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Lika, Backa, Banat
and Baranj a from Serbia, and put up a front against Serbia. "39
Protic immediately sent a message to Pasic from Corfu, announc-
ing the resignation of the entire cabinet and proposing that the prime
minister tender his resignation as well:
"What these gentlemen underscore and desire now is unheard of,
a government which has never existed anywhere, it is an expression of
distrust to you personally and against Serbia... I believe it is entirely
inappropriate that the ministers take oaths to anyone but our own King
who is our common ruler... please accept our resignations ... we believe
you yourself no longer have a place in such a government. .."40
On the occation of the Geneva Convention, Protic sent a message
to the deputies of the National Council, Korosec and Cingrija, via a
telegram sent to Serbia's envoy in London, Jovan Jovanovic. The mes-
sage, dated November 25, 1918, read as follows:
"Our brothers must decide, amongst themselves, whether or not
they accept sincerely, explicitly and purely, national and state unity in
the form of a modem, constitutional, parliamentary and democratic
monarchy with the Karadjordj evic dynasty at its head, on the basis of
the Corfu Declaration. A Constituent Assembly in which Serbia would
take part cannot settle this question, because we do not permit any dis-
cussion on two matters - the monarchy and the Karadjordjevic dy-
nasty. We grant our brothers outside Serbia full freedom to decide
upon this themselves.
If they accept this, there will be state and national unity and all
will be well; if they refuse, and relinquish the Corfu Declaration, it will
be a loss we shall deeply regret, but then each shall go his own way:
Serbs with the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with the Croats and Slo-
venes.?"!
38 Andrej Mitrovic, Srbija UfJlvom svetskom ratu, Belgrade j 984, ))9
39 Arhiv Jugoslavije, "Stojan Protic to the military envoy in London", November 12,
1918. folder Vi. doc. 1.
40 Pribicevic. 42.
41 Stojan Protic, Zenevski sporazlIlJl I njegovi odjeci, "Radikal", No. 34 L January 6.
1923.
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Ptotic reviewed this problem several times. In late 192 L he reit-
erated the same standpoint:
"If we should agree on such a healthy and broad enough basis.
then all IS well for all our people. for all three scions of our nation
If this should prove impossible. contrary to our sincere wishes.
then the road is open for us to amputate. however painful that may be,
though inevitable. and grant each side full liberty.v'? .
He did not alter his standpoint a year later
"Either we shall come to terms honestly. or part as friends. be-
cause that is better than confronting each other like two soldiers with
stuck guns. "43
On November 18. Nikola Pasic set up a new ministry. but it be-
came clear that the Geneva Declaration would remain 3 dead letter.
The Serbian government in Corfu refused to accept the Geneva accord.
as did the National Council in Zagreb. Svetozar Pribicevic was particu-
larly opposed to the accord. Unification appeared to take a completely
different course. What was important, however. was that the Geneva
meeting revealed more clearly than any other the true aims and inten-
nons of both sides The desire for 3 common state was onlv formallv u-
namrnous. Everything else differed so much that conflicts and
misunderstandings had to break out.
*
* *
Immediately following the act on unification. even before. in the
attempts to WID accord from the different participants in the creation of
Yugoslavia, essential questions were not purely ideological Even
though they appeared to be at fi rst glance.
The new state. with no past common to its unified nations. im-
posed the solving of national problems first. All negotianons on the
Unification, hom the Corfu Declaration. through the Geneva Confer-
ence to the final unification and character of the future consitution. fo-
cused on the arrangement of the state from the national standpoint.
That course was pursued in the common state.
The base of all confrontations and contrary viewpomts W3S es-
sentially national That means that pressing for certain political solu-
tions (freedom of choice. constitutionality. parliamentarism, democratic
-l2 Stoian Protic.[(adika!l/i kongres, "Radikal". No. :1-l. December [G. 1921.
-l-, "Rachkal". No 29(,. October 11.1922
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freedoms etc.) always concealed efforts to secure a more favorable po-
sition for one of the nations composing Yugoslavia. Not one point of
view was essentially ideological, founded on political conviction.
Many perceived Yugoslavia as an involuntary product, whose sole task
was to ensure an unhindered national constitution.'!" The idea of a com-
mon state was of secondary importance.
Non-Serbian political parties ad] usted easily to the newly created
political circumstances. For two essential reasons.
First, in the case of the Croats and Slovenes, the representatives
of these nations were united and organized. The Croatian Republican
Peasant Party (subsequently The Croatian Peasant Party) was by far
the largest and most influential organized group in Croatia.4:'A() Other
Croatian parties (Croatian Labor Party. Croatian Community and
Croatian Party of Law) were numerically inferior and less influential."?
They all acted as a national bloc in issues of national significance. The
Siovenian Human Party was the most important political factor among
the Slovenians.:"
Second, their experiences in the Habsburg Monarchy were quite
close to their activities within the newly created Yugoslav state."?
Croatian and Slovenian parties were wont to support not political prin-
ciples and ideological convictions, but press for a more prominent
place for their representatives in Hungarian or Austrian state bodies
Their activities boiled down to struggling for autonomy within Austria-
Hungary. They persisted with this policy in Yugoslavia. The new
multi-national state replaced the old one. This carried them to the idea
44 Vladimir COrovIC. Istorija Jugoslavije, Belgrade I9RY."90.
4:' At the I()23 elections. the Croatian Peasant Party won 4n.n3 votes and 70 seats
in parliament. See: Jovan Marianovic. Poiiti(ke strunke Kraljevinc SH,'"
(/919-1929), in/z istorijc .Iugosluvie, Belgrade IY:'R. 212.
46 "The Croatian Peasant Party is today what Starcevics party was yesterday, and that is
the first and chief representative or the Croatian people." Stjepan Radio, Politicki spisi,
Zagreb 1971. 339.
47 Hranko Petranmic.!stori;a.!ugoslavi;e J918-J(r8. Belgrade 19X1.4R.
4:\ The Slovcnian Human Party accounted for (lllYn of the Slovenian electorate Other
votes were dissipated on minor political groups. See: Banal', 342.
49 For all Southern Slavs from the former Austria-Hungary the principle of universal
suffrage was quite new. A high electoral census was maintained in
Austria-Hungary till the very end. Only 208,4 11 citizens had the right to vote in
Croatia and Slavonija at the last pre-war elections held on December 16, 1913.
The turnout was a little over hall' the electorate - I I I .O:')~ lJ7,4.06 abstained.
Grisogono. lJ7 Bogdan Krizman. Hrvatski sabor i uiedinjenjc J9 J8. godine. in
Stvaranjejugoslovenskc drzave tv J8. godine. Belgrade I 9X9, :' 1.
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of federalism, and separatism, for the 1110st persistanr.Y' Svetozar
Pribicevic himself was aware of this trait in Southern Slavs from Aus-
tria-Hungary when he spoke up in the Constituent Assembly:
"Gentlemen. when we discuss matters and affai rs of state. ~1 cer-
tain spirit emerges that is not noticeable on this side, here III Serbia.
which has had state independence for a hundred years It emerges
among us who are from the other regions. a spirit of negation, discon-
tent destruction.. We lived, gentlemen. in an alien state we did not
consider our own: everything we had to give to that state. we gave as a
'must'. Everything that state took from the people, the people believed
would turn against them; the people hated the state in which they Iived
and saw everything that came from that state as directed against them.
Thus a spirit of negation against the state became rooted in the people:
It must be driven out."51
The fact that all non-Serbian parties contained a national label in
their names is conducive to this conclusion
Parties that represented minor national groups held a similar
stand in politics (Yugoslav Muslim Organization, Montenegrin Feder-
alist Party etc.)
Immediately after the unification. the parties that rallied the
Serbs mostly split into two large groups: radicals and democrats.V The
National Radical Party was a political organization with the oldest tra-
dition and political heritage in Serbia. Led by politicians such as Nik-
ola Pasic, Stojan Protic and Milenko Vesnic, it maintained its high
position on the pol itical scale.i'
The Democratic Party, founded in early 1919, comprised inde-
pendents, progressives, liberals, part of the Croato-Serbian Coalition
and several pre-war men of politics. Immediately it became one of the
most influential and largest parties in the Kingdomv'
At the elections for the Constituent Assembly on November 23.
1920, these two parties won an overwhelming victory. taking most of
<o Corovic. 5XY.
:' I Stenografskc beleske Fstavotvorne skupstine Kraljevine Srba. Hrvata I Slo-
venaca. book I. minutes from the session dated Mav 12, 1921. Belgrade 1921. Y
:'1 Several minor parties also sought foll owers among the Serbian electorate
(Republican Partv. Ag.ncultural Partv. Social-Democratic Partv, etc)
:'3 See: Branislav Gligorijevic, Sukobi II vodjstvu radikalne stranke 1920-1928. Belgrade
1972
:'4 See: Brunislav Gligorijevic. Demokratska stranka i politicki odnosi II Kraljevini
Srba. Hrvata i Slovenaca. Belgrade 1970..
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the seats in paliament. The Democrats won 319,448 votes, securing 92
seats, and the Radicals 91 seats with 284,575 votes."
The next parliamentary elections were held on March 18, 1923.
The strength of the National Radical Party increased to 108 seats with
562,213 votes, and the Democrats were boiled down to nearly a half,
winning only 51 seats with 400,342 votes.I''
The two parties differed in both parts of their programs, more in
regard to their views on national issues than questions pertaining to po-
litical ideology. Even short-term coalitions which they made on sev-
eral occasions were an expression of momentary interest, never the
result of true political proximity.
Throughout their history, the Radicals' chief political principle
was a democratic state organization. The idea of parliamentary rule,
based on a system of divided authority, universal suffrage and local
self-adminstration were the basis of the Radicals' political program,
dating back to 1881. The Radicals always called for limited authority
to the Crown and the protection of all democratic freedoms. They ad-
t;, hered to these principles in the early days of the Yugoslav state.
l:' However, the basic problem of the unified state was not the ques-
tion of democratic parliamentarism. The main problem was opposing
views on the place and role of individual territorial and national units
within the common state. In reality, the question was reduced to vari-
ations of state arrangement starting from a single state, through various
forms of decentralization to the idea of federal organization and con-
cealed separatism.
It is quite clear that the party was rather disoriented in the new
political circumstances. It lost its chief stronghold in political ideology
and involuntarily become engaged in a struggle it was neither suited
nor ready for. Thus different views on the problem of state organiza-
tion emerged in the party from the very beginning. 57 Regardless of
these contradicitons, which shattered the party's unity and weakened
its force and infuence, the political background was always the same.
The different streams among the Radicals all wanted the national ques-
tion settled as soon as possible so that the new state community could
deal with the regular political situation. The party's program from
1920 bespeaks of this expressively:
55 Petranovic. 4R.
56 Jovan Marjanovic. Polittcke stranke Kralievine STIS i/919-1929). 212.
57 See Branislav Gligorijevic, Sukobi II vodjstvu radikalne stranke, 29
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"We consider a single state the one with a single parliament, to
which the state government is responsible and which, together with the
King, has undivided sovereign legislative authority in the whole coun-
try. The party considers another characterisic of a single state the prin-
ciple of self-government infused through the entire state and social
machine [...], with the same principle of self-government relevant to a
large region, that is, the region should be large enough for the principle
to become prominent without questioning the uniformity of the state
with its largeness and competence.t 'f
The concept of the priority of democratic freedoms above all
other political principles was developed by Stojan Protic
"If our Vojvodinians or Bosnians, or native Serbians, or Mon-
tenegrins or Croatians, are yet unable to bear the amount of freedom
that Serbia has, which Serbia has a right to lay claim to, after half a
century of political and parliamentary life, then let them enjoy the
amount that suits them, or which the specific cirumstances dictate, for
the time being. "Sl)
The Radicals did not develop as a party of the national bloc. The
role was imposed on them. It is no wonder they were disoriented.
On the other hand, the party was the bearer of national construc-
tion. Both in Serbia and Yugoslavia. However, different political cir-
cumstances made it much less successful in Yugoslavia than it had
been in Serbia. The unified state demanded an alliance of national par-
ties, not an ideological bloc. The Radicals were able to lead the latter.
But, unfortunately, they had neither the experience nor understanding
for the former. The party was and remained a Serbian party which
needed national unity in order to operate with success. As the national
is always more powerful than the ideal. Probably because it is based on
the biased and emotional.
All efforts of individual Radical leaders to find a suitable national
solution in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes ended in defeat.
The party lost some of its best men in discords and differences over the na-
tional question. All suffered from the loss. Yugoslavia and the Radicals.
The other large party in the new state, with its base in Belgrade,
was the Democratic Party. Its position and activities on the new politi-
cal stage differed somewhat from those of the Radicals.
58 Zakljucci i rezolucija radikalnih zemaljskih konferencija II 1920. i 1921, Belgrade
1923.3-4
59 Stojan Protic. Oko ustava, Belgrade 1921,65
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Since the beginning of organization, the Democrats acted as a
completely monolithic group. It was quite evident that there were two
streams within the party. One, comprising leaders from Serbia, mostly
from the former Autonomous Radical Party, and the other, which ral-
lied former members of the Croato-Serbian Coalition, Serbs from Aus-
tria-Hungary. At the head of the former group stood, unofficially,
Milorad Draskovic, and the latter was led by Svetozar Pribicevic.v?
The essential point in the position of the Democrats''! in regard to
the national question, that is, political ideology, is that the two groups
differed mostly on this point. The political experience of the followers
of Svetozar Pribicevic resembled those of the non-Serbian political
parties. They, too, struggled for a more prominent place and role in the
Habsburg Monarchy Questions pertaining to a democratic system
were to them incomparably minor in importance. They conveyed this
mentality into Yugoslavia.
The idea of a single and centralized state is rooted in the percep-
tions of these politicians, just as the idea of a federation arose from
Croatian political parties. Both viewed the problem from the same an-
gle. But the points of view were different.
As time went on, it became increasingly clear that Serbian politi-
cal parties had accepted the new rules of national policy. Pressured
partly by circumstances, partly under the influence of Serbian politi-
cians from Croatia. Questions on the political organization of the uni-
fied state gradually lost significance before surges of ardent national
desires. Instead of becoming a democratic community where every in-
dividual would be free to express his own political convictions, Yugo-
slavia tumed into a battleground of conflicting national interests.
Conclusions that may be drawn from a deliberation on this course
are both complex and far-reaching. There is no point here in searching
for them. Perhaps one might stop to think about a basic question.
Is it possible at all to reconcile different national interests and
principles of real democracy?
Or does one necessarily exclude the other?
60 Corovic, 591.
61 For more particulars all the Democratic Party see: Branislav Gligorijevic,
Demokratska stranka...
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*
International cirumstances altered drastically since the beginning
of 1918. The United States became involved in the war as an "associ-
ate force" on the side of the Entente 111 April the previous year. The
time for the final outcome was approaching.
US. President Woodraw Wilson published 111 January 1918 a
manifest of the U.S. war aims set out 111 the celebrated "Fourteen
Points". The program served subsequently as a basis for the peace con-
ference in Paris (January 18, 1919 - January 20, 1920). Concisely, the
F01lI1een Points outlined the following: I. Canceling all secret diplo-
marie contracts: 2. Free sail in all seas: 3 Removing economic obsta-
cles as much as possible; 4. Arms reduction; 5. Unbiased arrangement
of colonial demands; 6. Liberation of Russian territory; 7. Restoration
of Belgium; 8. Liberation of France and return of Alsacc-Lorraine, 9.
Retailoring Italian borders along clearly recognizable national lines;
10 Autonomous development of the peoples of Austria-Hungary: II.
Liberation of the territories of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro with
access to the sea for Serbia; 12. Self-government to the peoples in the
Ottoman Empire and free passage through the Dardanelles: 13. Crea-
tion of independent Poland with free and safe access to the sea: 14. Or-
ganizing a world community of nations with the aim of guaranteeing
the independence of all states.
Honoring Wilson's program, the Paris Peace Conference refused
to recognize any secret agreement contracted during the war. This was
binding, before any other accords, to the London 1915 pact, although
Italy was obstinate on its provisions being applied.
The Fourteen Points set out above all the principles of national
self-determination. Although there is no direct reference to the applica-
tion of the principle, the entire context points to the underlying meaning
of the document. National self-determination can in other words be de-
fined as a national state. The Paris Conference endeavored to apply this
principle consistently, but as always, certain interests of the victorious
powers overwhelmed the aspiration toward the universal principle.
For the Serbian cause, it was of the utmost importance that nei-
ther the manifest, nor the war program of Great Britain, also dating
from the early 1918,62 mentioned the disintegration of Austria-Hun-
62 The program of Britain s war aims was set out b: Prime Minister I)a\ld Llovd
George 1Il a speech to the trade unions. on January 5. 1918. On this occasion. the
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gary. Both programs envisaged a survival of the Habsburg Monarchy
in a federal rearrangement. The U.S. administration on June 26, 1918,
undertook as its objective to break up the artificial Austrian ernpire.v'
Serbia was faced with two dangers: the preservation of the
Habsburg Monarchy and Italy's entrance into the Balkans. As the re-
sult of victory in World War 1, Serbia expected the fulfillment or two
chief goals: the disintegration of Austria-Hungary whereby the libera-
tion and annexation of the Austrian Serbs would be accomplished, and
subsequently the Croats and Slovenes, and secondly, winning access to
the Adriatic. Insisting on Yugoslav unification as the most important
mission of Serbian policy was to neutralize both these dangers and pro-
vide the most appropriate way to achieve both goals.
*
* *
Two years after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, the Constituent Assembly convened on December 12, 1920,
worked more than six months, closing finally on June 28, 1921, with
the adoption of the constitution. ()4
The question of the character of the common state was a stum-
bling block ever since the unification. It is necessary, therefore, to ex-
amine the contrasting views on the state. Only thus can the true nature
of the first Yugoslav constitution be perceived, but also the nature of
Yugoslav misunderstanding.
The question of national and state rights of the individual peoples
that joined the new state community was the crux of the problem. Two
aspirations, Serbian and Croatian, are quite clear. Both departed from
their individual historical and national interests and owing to those dif-
ferences collided immediately. The third perception was essentially the
one generally called integral Yugoslavism.
The source and content of these views demand separate and thor-
ough analysis.
English government stressed the intention to preserve the Habsburg Monarchy
and offered guarantees for autonomous positions for Southern Slavs. Like
Wilson's plan. which was revealed only three days later. Britain also urged the
restoration of the Kingdom ot' Serbia and Montenegro Sec: Jankovic and
Mirkovic. 3'\0
()3 Ekmecic, Stvaranie Jugoslavije, 777.-774.
64 The Constitution of St. Vitus' J.);,y was passed with a simple majority of 223
votes; 35 votes were opposed, and 161 deputies left the Constituent Assembly
earlier.
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The Croatian viewpoint was based not on political and lawful re-
ality, but in terms of public Jaw as passed on from the Habsburg 1\10n-
archy The disappearance of Austria-Hungary restored state legal
personality to Croatia. The minutes of a Croatian assembly held on Oc-
tober 29, 1918, clearly point to this course of reflection: 1. All state re-
lations cease between the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia
on one side and the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire on
the other: 2 Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia with Rijeka are proclaimed an
independent state, thus according to the modern principle of national-
ity, and on the basis of the national unity of Slovenes, Croats and
Serbs, join the single national sovereign state of Slovenes, Croats and
Serbs; 3. The universal national constituent assembly of all the unified
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs will decide in a previously established
qualified majority which fully protects against any majorization in the
form of rule, as well as the internal state organization of our state.
founded on the full equality of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs; 4. The
Croatian Assembly recognizes supreme authority to the National
Council in the state of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.i"
So, during the unification, there was not only the sovereign King-
dom of Serbia, but an independent Croatian state as well. These two
equal factors conducted negotiations and arranged the terms for unifi-
cation. This particularly refers to the adoption of the constitutional act.
So the Southern Slavic community, according to the Croatian pnnci-
ple. was the result of a deal between two independent states as repre-
sentatives of two free nations. Resemblance with the Austro-Hungarian
model is more than obvious.v"
A speech by Mate Drinkovic, a Croatian Community (National
Club) deputy in the Constituent Assembly, may serve as a good exam-
ple. Referring to the minutes of the Croatian assembly of October 29.
1918, and to instructions by the National Council to the delegation for
negotiations on unification, he said the following:
"Since this assembly refuses to pay heed, even deliberately wants
to destroy the foundations which this state is built on, and to impose
():' Slobodan Jovanovic. Politicke i pmv'I7i' rasprave 2. 292-293.
()() It IS interesting to note that Svetozar Pribicevic favored this \iC\\]J0Il11 I Ic maintained
that Croatia had indisputably confirmed its statehood with the Croato-Hungarian
accord of 1R()R. He drew the conclusion wherebv the act of unification was a
two-sided accord. This notable representative of Scrb's accross the border proceeded to
establish that the success or the new state rested on the need 10 enable the Croats full
development olCroatian individualir, Prihicc\Il:.7.':;3-':;(,
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upon the COWltlY a constitution through numerical majorization regard-
less of the position of the representatives of the Croatian people, the
National Club feels compelled to retract, as it explicitly does retract,
the legitimacy of this assembly and its right to enact a constitution
valid for Croatia and the Croatian people until agreement is reached
that eliminates the rnajorization of Croatians. "67
The Serbian standpoint stressed the fact whereby only Serbia
had unquestionable international recognition and an internal constitu-
tional arrangement. Serbi a, a sovereign state, emerged from the war as
a victorious power. This brought on the conclusion that the Austro-
Hungarian Yugoslavs were annexed to Serbia, which passed on to the
new state community its external subjectivity, its own Dynasty and
Crown, as well as its entire internal order. The convening of the Con-
stituent Assembly was to be a natural continuation of the internal con-
struction of a state on the foundations of the previous Serbian state
system. Internal legal discontinuity was received only conditionally.
As a concession and expression of good will.
Refusal by the big powers to a requisition of the National Coun-
cil that it be recognized as the government of the State of Slovenes,
Croats and Serbs went in favor of this conception. The requisition was
sent on November 3, 1918, to the governments of France, Great Brit-
ain, the United States and Italy68 Five days later, on November 8, only
the Serbian government was willing to recognize the National Council
as a legitimate representative of the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs. This
was regarded as a gesture of generosity toward a side whose status was
at least disputable.
The international legal continuity between the Kingdom of Serbia
and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was convincingly con-
firmed in a Contract on the Protection of Minorities, dated September
10, 1919. Item 12 of the Contract reads:
"Until the conel usion of new contracts and conventions, the State
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will be bound by any contract, conven-
tion or agreement wherein Serbia was on one side and any of the major
allied or associated powers on the other as contractual parties, as of
August 1, 1914 or thereafter, as well as all obligations undertaken by
67 Stenografske beleske l'stavotvome skupsiine, l:'i
68 ~ee: Pavle D. Osten ic. The Truth About Yugoslavia. New York 1962, 92.
Culinovic. 93.
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Serbia toward the allied or associated major powers before or after that
date. "69
For Serbia, the question of state continuity was virtually superflu-
ous. Serbia was prepared to bestow on her newly liberated brothers all
her national and state achievements and triumphs. Thus it was only
natural that Yugoslavia be an extension of Serbian statehood.
The concept of integral Yugoslavism was particularly widespread
among the Serbian and Croatian intelligentsia but was slow to diffuse
among the masses of one or the other nation. This conviction is based
on an unhistorical assumption: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are one na-
tion that was divided by big powers owing to numerous plights
throughout history and deprived of its national state. Differences in re-
ligion, customs and political development emerged as a consquence of
this forced separation. Therefore the Yugoslavs became divided into
tribes, not nations, and so the differences among them are merely
tribal, not national. Unification came as the realization of an ancient
and natural desire for the Southem Slavs to live together in a single
state. The product that was created is a new state with a new constitu-
tional arrangement This view was founded on the assumption of a "tri-
ple-named nation" and a single language, "Serbo-Croato-Slovenian".
The champion of this view, the Democratic Party, rallied most of the
adherents of this idea, but was unsuccessful in tuming it to a general
national ideology.I"
*
* *
Thus three different perceptions of the character of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes met on the political scene. Beneath for-
mal differences three national ideas were buried. Two of them old and
historical - the Serbian and Croatian, and the third one new - the Yugo-
slav."
69 "Sluzbene novine Kraljevine SHS", year II, 1920, No. 1:13.
70 See: Slobodan Jovanovic. Politicke i pravne rasprave 2. :101-324 Slobodan
Jovanovic. Jugoslovenska misao II proslosti i buducnosti. Belgrade I(n 9.
71 This was felt only partiallv bv Ivo Banac. though even he failed to draw out
conclusions to the end Encumbered bv the mission to iusiifv the Croatian Side. he
succumbed to national temptations clnd lost the chl~f trait of a historian. His
remark that the "Yugoslav question was an expression of opposed national
ideologies that developed in each of their national and religious communities"
was finely put but he did not venture into any deeper analysis His judgement on
the Constitution of St. Vitus' Dav is vague as well. In one place, he writes of the
"final triumph of the Serbian national ideologv". but on the following pages says
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The Serbian and Croatian were true national ideologies where-
from the first developed on the basis of building a national state and
the other in a struggle for autonomy from central rule. The Serbian rep-
resented itself as traditionally nationally constructive, the Croatian as
federalist, verging on separatist. The Serbs protected what they had ac-
complished theretofore without being overeager to merge completely.
Croatians demanded the status of a federal unit they were never able to
achieve in the HabsburgMonarchy and thus make the first step toward
their own statehood.
The Yugoslav idea was supra-national rather than national. It pre-
supposed the obliteration of national traits and historical heritage that
the Serbs and Croats had achieved, building upon them their own ide-
ologies. The Yugoslavs, aware of the insufficient strength of their own
convictions, insisted on a unitary state organization as the most suit-
able means to consolidate the Yugoslav ideology.
The idea of integral Yugoslavism triumphed eventually. The con-
stitution of St. Vitus' Day consistently established the organization
based on the assumption of a single nation, single language and single
state. 72 For the sake of truth, the Yugoslav concept was closer to the
Serbian standpoint than the Croatian one. It guaranteed a central state,
even if it did renounce its solely Serbian character. The Serbian idea
developed more into a state, and less a national idea. At the cost of the
national, the Serbs accepted Yugoslavism.
The Constitution of St. Vitus' Day however, was contrary to the
Croatian perception of a nation and state. It denied the Croats in every
way the historical right to autonomy, let alone a federation. Abreast
with this, universal suffrage denied the Croatians in Austria-Hungary,
gave wing to the Croatian national movement. The constitution was
the constitution "posed a compromise between the ideologies of Yugoslav
unitarism and Serbian nationalism". Banac, surely the most knowledgable of
Croatian historians of the younger generation, seems vague about the notions -
nation and state, Serbian and Croatian national ideas and integral Yugoslavism
Sec Banac. 4()~-407
72 It should be noted here that the dilemma on the character of the Yugoslav nation
still remains. Addressing the National Assemblv on Januarv 22. 1922. Svetozar
Pribicevic said: "Are \v~ one nation. or are \\e' not If we are not. let us sav so
openly If we have a peculiar Serbian national individuality. separate CrOiitian
national individuality. if we have a separate Slovenian national indiviualitv , let us
speak out openly Vie are not of the same n.uion and let us seck a modus
vivendi. Either we are one nation. hut tl1C,1 \i L' can not negotiate as one nation
with another nation." Stenografske bclcske Xarodnc s!mp,5111lC' Kraljevine SHS.
1921/22. book L l)l~
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adopted in agreement between the representatives of Serbianism and
Yugoslavism, althougth its provisions reflected the standpoint of the
latter conception.
Then the Serbian concepts of nation and state became muddled.
Supra-national Yugoslavism was to come instead of national Serbism.
Matters were clearing up for the Croats But, for the Serbs, they be-
came more entangled. With the creation of Yugoslavia, Croatian na-
tionalism was enlivened as never before. Serbian nationalism found
itself in obliterated space, untangled between national integration and
state grounds. Unification brought Croats closer to their ultimate aim -
the forming of a national state. It distanced the Serbs from an already
achieved aim.
The seeds of subsequent delusions and stumbling gaits were
planted in the act of December 1, 1918.
Jyn)CJIOBEHCKA 11HEJA
11YJELU1IbLlhE 1918. 1'OLU11-fE
P e '1 II Me
Te)K]IIIITC pana CTaBJbCnO je na I1aCTanaK jyroc.ronencae JW)KaBC TOKOl\1
Tlpnor CBCTCKor paTa 11 IIa IbCHO IIOJ1IITJIlIKO (ycTaBHO) KOHCTlITYTlICaIhC nne
rOJJ:IIHC JJ:OI~nnJe.
Cvnrrnaa je y TBpJ~IhH JJ:<l CC Y jyroCI013CHCKoj JJ:p)KaBU cyupo'rcran.t.ajy
TpH pa3JIWIHTa cxanarn,a. rj. TpU uamronarme nneje xoje cy 6U.1C 1I3BOP CBIIX
pa%lIIMOln(l)KCILa IBMCl)y Cp6a Ii Xpsa'ra xao l~Ba najMHOrOJbYJJ:Hnja HapOJl,a y
Jyrocnasnja.
PaJJ: cc vacnnsa na 'resn 0 clJyHJI,al\lCHTa;lnoj cyKo6.bCHOCTH cpnCKC IIJI,ejc
jyrOC:IOBCHCKoj. IlITO ayrop H1BOJl,H In 'reopnjcxe ananrrse 6UTIIILX cnojcrana
HaI~nOHa.TJHIIXJl,p)KaBa y OJl,IIOCY na BHIllCIIaQHOIIaJIHC,
